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Abstract 
It is commonly agreed that the government is more likely to step in and rescue some 
troubled companies labeled as “Too-Big-to-Fail” or “Too-Interconnected-to-Fail”. 
Since there is no formal contract between these companies and the government, this 
potential intervention is referred to as an implicit government guarantee. We propose a 
new approach of assessing and estimating the implicit government guarantee and 
analyze whether it is reflected in the CDS spreads. We define the implicit government 
guarantee for a given company as the probability that the government will bail it out in 
case of a default. Although the company’s size affects the likelihood of the 
government intervention, we find that the financial industry membership is a more 
important factor. Furthermore, we find that the implicit government guarantee is 
priced into the CDS spreads. The government guarantee for the large companies 
reduces the CDS spread by about 16.11 bps and for the small companies only by about 
3.73 bps. Similarly, for the financial industry we find that the government guarantee 
reduces the CDS spread by about 76.29 bps and for the non-financial industry only by 
about 7.50 bps. 
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1. Introduction 
Failure of some financial and non-financial firms may come at a very high cost to the 
society and have spillover effects across all sectors of the economy. To avoid crisis propagation, 
the government is likely to step in and rescue certain firms deemed “Too Big”, “Too Important”, 
or “Too Interconnected” to fail. Since companies do not pay for the possibility of being bailed 
out by the government who does not clearly indicate whether or not it will intervene, it can be 
considered an implicit government guarantee. The implicit government guarantee may vary from 
one firm to another depending on the characteristics of the firm, like the firm size, the sector, and 
the connection with the overall economy. Government propensity to intervene also changes 
across time. One of the side effects of the implicit government guarantee to the firm is that it 
may lead to the distorted perception about the company’s risk of default by investors. The 
expectation that the government will intervene to protect the firm from failure biases investors’ 
expectation about company’s risk of default downward. The broadly used indicator of the level 
of company’s perceived default risk is the CDS spread. The credit default swap (CDS) is the 
contract that protects the CDS buyer against the default of the referenced company. The CDS 
spread is the premium paid by the CDS buyer to the CDS seller for such protection. Since the 
CDS spreads could be affected by the implicit government guarantee, they might not fully reflect 
the underlying default risk of the firm. This has certain implications both from the regulators’ 
and the investors’ perspectives.  
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we propose a new way of estimating the 
implicit government guarantee. The implicit government guarantee remains a public policy 
concern because it may involve transfer of resources from the government to the bailed out 
companies and, as the financial crises of 2007-2009 showed, the costs to the taxpayers and the 
society in general could be very high. Therefore, estimating the implicit government guarantee 
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continues to be an important matter. Second, we explore the relationship between the CDS 
spreads and the implicit government guarantee. Our findings in this area have important 
implications, for example, for the estimation of the default probability and the amount of the 
regulatory capital. 
The recent global financial crisis sparked a particular interest in estimating the value of 
the implicit government guarantee and a number of papers attempted to measure it using 
different approaches. One group of papers (see, for example, Noss and Sowerbutts [2012], Baker 
and McArthur [2009], and Li, Qu, and Zhang [2010]) relates implicit government guarantee to 
the cost of funding. They argue that in the presence of implicit government guarantee firms enjoy 
reduced cost of funding and a reduction in the cost of funding reflects the size of the implicit 
government guarantee. The actual strategy used for computing the government subsidy varies 
depending on the study. For example, Baker and McArthur [2009] use the difference in the 
funding costs between small and large US banks before and after TARP as an estimate for the 
subsidy. The main problem with this approach is that it makes an implicit assumption that only 
large financial institutions receive government support. Ueda and di Mauro [2012] and Haldane 
[2010] estimate the value of the government subsidy to the financial institutions based on the 
expectations of government support embedded in the company’s credit ratings. Credit rating 
companies publish “individual” and “support” credit ratings. “Individual” rating assesses 
company’s strength on a stand alone basis, whereas “support” rating incorporates the probability 
that the company will receive government support. The implicit government guarantee is 
estimated as a difference between bank’s cost of funding implied by the “support” credit rating 
and the cost of funding implied by the “individual” credit rating. The general criticism of the 
rating based approach is that it is subject to credit rating agency’s judgment regarding company’s 
creditworthiness whereas credit rating agencies have been know to make mistakes in the past, for 
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example, in rating structured securities. Another group of papers (see, for example, Gapen 
[2009], Lucas and McDonald [2009], and Oxera [2011]) attempts to measure the implicit 
government guarantee by using the contingent claims analysis. They represent the value of the 
implicit government guarantee as a put option on the firm’s assets with the strike price equal to 
the firms’ default barrier. The firm defaults when the value of the firm’s assets falls below some 
threshold (e.g. promised payment on the debt) at some future time. If at maturity of the option 
the firm’s assets value is above the default barrier, then the option is not exercised. However, if 
the firm’s assets value falls below the threshold, then the option is exercised and its payoff is 
equal to the difference between the strike (the default barrier) and the value of the firm’s assets. 
The implicit government guarantee is estimated as the expected value of the put option payoff. 
The contingent claims approach requires modeling the dynamics of a firm’s future assets’ values. 
For example, Gapen [2009] uses Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model to compute the 
value of the implicit government guarantee to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The shortcoming of 
the Black-Scholes-Merton model is that it assumes that the firm’s (log) asset values are normally 
distributed which precludes the possibility of sudden changes in the firm’s asset values. Both 
Lucas and McDonald [2009], and Oxera [2011] extend Black-Scholes-Merton model to 
incorporate the possibility of jumps in asset prices and investigate a wider range of parameter 
values. The main problem with the contingent claims approach is that it is very sensitive to the 
underlying assumptions and the model tends to get very complex as more realistic assumptions 
are made. 
In this paper we propose a different methodology of estimating the implicit government 
guarantee. We define the implicit government guarantee as the probability that the government 
will bail out a firm facing default. To estimate the probability of the government intervention we 
use the Logit model which we apply to a set of 1209 bankrupt and bailed out companies between 
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2000 and 2010. Then for a sample of companies with publicly available CDS spreads, we 
construct a government guarantee variable and investigate its relationship with the CDS spreads. 
Since the government guarantee reduces the risk of company’s default, we expect the CDS 
spreads to be lower when the probability of the government intervention is high, that is we 
expect to find a negative relationship between the CDS spreads and the government guarantee 
variable. Our definition of the implicit government guarantee differs from the previous studies 
mainly in that it is simple, more intuitive and provides a clear interpretation. For instance, we can 
define the full government guarantee as a probability of one and no government guarantee as a 
probability of zero. By focusing on the value of the government guarantee other studies make it 
strongly dependent on the company’s financial health. Companies in high default risk situation 
will see the value of their contingent claims increase even if the behavior of the government does 
not change. Our empirical analysis shows that, although the company’s size affects the 
likelihood of the government intervention, the financial industry membership is a more important 
determinant. Furthermore, we find that the implicit government guarantee is indeed priced into 
the CDS spreads and the relationship is negative. The government guarantee for the large 
companies reduces the CDS spreads by about 16.11 bps and for the small companies only by 
about 3.73 bps. Similarly, for the finance industry we find that the government guarantee reduces 
the CDS spreads by about 76.29 bps and for the non-finance industry only by about 7.5 bps.  
We also provide some practical implications of the relationship between the government 
guarantee and the CSD spreads both from the investors’ and the regulators’ perspectives. As the 
CDS spreads are often used in the finance industry to estimate the probability of default (PD) and 
the amount of the regulatory capital, we suggest that some adjustments should be used to account 
for the fact that the risk levels in the CDS spreads are based on the expectation of potential 
government intervention. In fact, the PD implied from the CDS spreads may be lower than the 
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actual PD without government intervention. Therefore, we believe that a PD model should 
control for such possibility. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our methodology 
and the data set for estimating the government guarantee. Section 3 lays out the framework for 
analyzing the relationship between the implicit government guarantee and the CDS spreads and 
describes the CDS dataset along with the control variables we use in our analysis. Section 4 
presents and summarizes our empirical findings. Section 5 provides further implications of 
government guarantee, while section 6 concludes. 
2. Estimation of the Implicit Government Guarantee 
We present the methodology used to estimate the implicit government guarantee before 
describing the dataset we use in this step. 
2.1. Methodology  
Government guarantee is a concept frequently used to describe the government 
intervention, but measuring it is a difficult issue. As the government makes no explicit 
commitment to rescue the firm in a default situation, the ex-ante assessment of this guarantee is 
challenging. We define the government guarantee as the probability that the government will 
step in and rescue a company in distress. To predict the probability of the government 
intervention we use the Logit model. The Logit model provides a way to describe a relationship 
between several independent variables and a binary dependant variable, expressed as a 
probability. As suggested by the literature and to keep the model parsimonious, we use the 
company size and the dummy variable indicating whether or not the firm belongs to the finance 
industry as explanatory variables. We have also experimented with a few other explanatory 
variables and different models specifications (see Table 2) and chose the more parsimonious 
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model which happen to be model 2. To predict the probability of the government intervention we 
fit the data to the following Logistic function: 
0
0
exp( _  )
1 exp( _ )
s f
g
s f
lasset Dum Finance
lasset Dum Finance
  

  
 

  
   (1) 
Where, g  – the probability that the government will step in and rescue the 
distressed company (government guarantee); 
lasset – the natural logarithm of the total assets measured via their 
accounting value; 
Dum_Finance –  the dummy variable indicating whether the company belongs to the 
financial industry or not; 
 After we estimate the above logistic equation, the resulting values are used in conjunction 
with the company size and its financial industry membership to construct a government 
guarantee variable for each of the companies that we use in our subsequent research. 
2.2. Government Guarantee Data 
To estimate the implicit government guarantee we use the set of 1209 companies. This 
data set includes both bankrupt and bailout companies over the period from 2000 to 2010. We 
use the list of bankrupt companies from UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database.1 We 
define the bailout companies as all firms bailed out by the government from 2000 to 2010. Any 
bailout in our study involves an injection of government money. The list of such companies is 
                                                          
1 A sample of bankrupt companies’ data can be found on the website: http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/ and to obtain a full 
list, an email can be sent to the website author. 
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available from ProPublica’s website.2 As presented in Table 1, we have 884 bankrupt 
companies; 13.57% of them are from the finance industry. Our data sample also includes 325 
companies bailed out by the government; 93.54% of them are the financial institutions. The 
correlation between the finance dummy variable and the bailout dummy variable is 75.48% and 
the correlation between the assets size variable and the bailout dummy is 35.96%. 
3. Relationship with the CDS spread 
With the implicit government guarantee, investors adjust their perception of the 
company’s risk of default. To understand whether the implicit government guarantee affects the 
investors’ perception of the company’s risk of default, we explore the relationship between the 
government guarantee variable constructed in the previous section and the CDS spreads. The 
CDS spread is a premium that must be paid by a protection buyer to the protection seller 
annually over the life of the contract, expressed in basis points. Since the CDS spread is a good 
proxy for the level of the company’s default risk, we expect it to be negatively related to the 
level of the implicit government guarantee. 
3.1. The CDS Spread Regression Specification 
To relate the CDS spreads to the implicit government guarantee we use a panel 
regression. The panel regression is a method typically used to analyze multi-dimensional data. 
Since our data set includes both cross sectional and time series data, the panel regression is a 
suitable procedure. For our analysis we chose the constant coefficient panel regression model 
which is an OLS regression on a pooled data. In our regression we include the government 
                                                          
2 For the list of government bailout companies follow the link: http://www.propublica.org/special/government-
bailouts. Here, bailouts are defined by specific programs (e.g. TARP) through which the government provides 
financial help to prevent companies from default. 
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guarantee variable as well as additional firm-specific and macroeconomic control variables 
described in the next section: 
titmtiftiggti uMacroFirmCS ,11,1,,0,       (2) 
Where, πg,i,t-1  the implicit government guarantee;  
Firmi,t-1 firm-specific variables; and 
Macrot-1 macroeconomic variables.  
We define the CSi,t as a relative CDS spread of the company i at time t.
3 The relative CDS 
spread is computed by taking the midpoint between the bid and the ask quotes for the firm and 
dividing it by the five-year T-bond rate. The main rational for such definition of the relative CDS 
spread is that the CDS spread is approximately the difference between the corporate bond yield 
and the risk-free rate. Note that all the explanatory variables are lagged by one time period (i.e., 
one day). This is done to avoid simultaneity problem. We first run the regression with only the 
government guarantee variable. Then, we add various firm-specific control variables, such as 
equity volatility, firm credit ratings, leverage, and various macroeconomic variables as suggested 
by the empirical literature.  
                                                          
3 We use the relative CDS spread instead of the absolute spread in order to control for the risk-free rate over which 
the spread is implicitly based. While the absolute CDS spread should provide a good estimate of the risk level 
across firms at a given point in time, from a time series perspective, the level of the risk-free rate may affect the 
spread, as investors tend to make a tradeoff between corporate bonds and treasuries. For the same corporate risk 
level, investors will require a larger spread to switch to corporate bonds when treasury rate is larger. For instance, 
let’s suppose that for a given company on day 1 the risk-free rate is 0.2% and the CDS spread is 1%, while on day 2 
the risk-free rate is 5%. Assuming that the underlying risk level for that company remains the same for these two 
days, an investor who on day 1 was indifferent between 0.2% interest rate on treasury and 1.2% yield on corporate 
bond, will more likely prefer 5% interest rate on treasury to 6% yield on corporate bond. This will push the yield 
higher and the spread (which follows the difference with the treasury rate) will increase. The relative CDS spread is 
a way to adjust for this time varying effect of the risk-free rate, while remaining equivalent to the absolute CDS 
spread in cross-section. One may think of a linear adjustment and assume that the treasury rate as a regressand is 
sufficient, however, we believe that a proportional adjustment is more appropriate. 
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3.2. CDS Data 
Our CDS data sample consists of the US companies listed on Bloomberg as of May 2010. 
We use daily data for the period from January 2000 through May 2010 and we focus on 5-year 
CDS contracts. The CDS data were available for 1,421 companies in nine industry segments. 
However, not every company offered information about all other independent variables. Out of 
1,421 filings, only 363 offered insight into their historical CDS spreads as well as all other 
independent variables. In our analysis we used only complete listings, so our final sample 
consists of 363 firms. Out of these firms, about 10% come from the finance industry. Note, 
companies that offered limited CDS data were included into the data sample, therefore, the 
resulting data set is unbalanced.  
3.3. Firm Specific Variables 
In our regressions we use a number of firm specific control variables that can potentially 
explain the variation of the CDS spreads. 
1. Equity Implied Volatility. 
Zhang, Zhou and Zhu [2009] find that volatility risk alone predicts about 50% of the 
variation in the CDS spread levels. Furthermore, Cao, Yu and Zhong [2010] find that put-
option implied volatility dominates historical volatility in explaining the time-series 
variation in CDS spreads.  In our study we use the average daily implied volatility of the 
firm call and put options available from Bloomberg as a proxy for volatility. We expect it 
to be positively related to the CDS spreads because higher volatility increases probability 
of firm’s default. 
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2. Leverage 
We compute the leverage ratio as: 
Total Liabilities
Total Assets
 
The data was obtained from COMPUSTAT. Since accounting data is only available at the 
quarterly level, we use linear interpolation to obtain daily data. Just like equity return, 
leverage can be used as an indicator of firm’s financial health. We expect positive 
relationship between firm’s leverage and the CDS spreads. 
3. Credit Ratings 
Credit ratings reflect general credit worthiness of the company and its ability to make 
payments. In our regressions we use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
company’s credit rating is A- or higher, and 0 if it is below. The credit rating data was 
collected from Bloomberg. We use ratings provided by Standard & Poors rating agency. 
Whenever the ratings by S&P are not available, we use the ratings by Moody’s. We 
expect negative relationship between the CDS spreads and company’s credit rating. 
4. Liquidity Risk 
The liquidity risk can be thought of as an ability to trade large quantities of securities 
quickly without causing significant changes in the market prices. We compute the 
liquidity risk as the CDS bid-ask spread divided by the mid-value of the bid and ask. Bid-
ask spread is the most widely used proxy for the liquidity risk. Security is considered to 
be liquid if it has small bid-ask spread. The theoretical literature on whether liquidity 
should have a positive or negative effect on the CDS spreads is ambiguous. For example, 
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Tan and Yan [2007] find that relative CDS spreads tend to increase with the bid-ask 
spread. Acharya and Johnson [2007] find weak negative relationship between the CDS 
spreads and the relative bid-ask spread. More recently, Pires, Pereira and Martins [2011] 
find that the CDS premiums increase with the absolute bid-ask spreads and decrease with 
the relative bid-ask spreads. 
3.4. Macroeconomic Variables 
In our analysis we also control for four macroeconomic variables that can potentially 
explain the variations in the CDS spreads. All of our macroeconomic data were obtained from 
Bloomberg. We discuss each of these variables individually: 
i. Treasury rate 
In our analysis we use a series of 5-year Treasury rates. The theoretical literature on 
whether the spot interest rates should have a positive or negative effect on the CDS 
spreads is ambiguous. Longstaff and Schwartz [1995] find that credit spreads are 
negatively related to interest rates because higher interest rates reduce probability of 
default which in turn reduces the credit spreads. Negative relationship was also found by 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin [2001] and Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo [2009]. 
However, high interest rates can also be related to tightened monetary policy. For 
example, Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu [2009] find that short term interest rates have significant 
positive effects on the CDS spreads which they connect to changes in monetary policy.  
ii. Short-term interest rate 
We use a 6-month LIBOR rate and its effect on the CDS spreads is ambiguous due to the 
same reasoning as for the Treasury rate. 
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iii. Slope of the treasury yield curve 
We compute the slope of the treasury yield curve as the difference between a10-year rate 
Treasury rate and a 2-year Treasury rate. The slope of the yield curve is an indicator of 
expectation of future interest rates. The expected effect of the slope on the CDS spreads 
is ambiguous. The slope can be considered an indicator of the overall economic health. If 
the term structure has a positive slope, this is considered to be an indicator of “good 
times”. If this is the case the relationship between the slope and the CDS spreads should 
be negative. Significant negative relationship between the slope of the yield curve and the 
CDS spreads was found, for example, by Cao, Yu, and Zhong [2010]. However, the 
positive slope of the yield curve can also be connected to the economic environment with 
rising inflation and tightened monetary policy. In this case the relationship between the 
slope and the CDS spreads will be positive. Significant positive relationship between the 
slope of the yield curve and the CDS spreads was found, for example, by Zhang, Zhou, 
and Zhu [2009]. 
iv. S&P 500 daily return 
We use closing values of S&P500 index to compute S&P500 daily return. Since higher 
market returns are related to improved market conditions, we expect negative relationship 
between index returns and the CDS spreads. 
Expected signs on the coefficients of the regression of the relative CDS spreads against 
the described explanatory variables are summarized in Table 4. 
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3.5. Summary Statistics 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the CDS spreads and explanatory variables used in 
the CDS regressions. Due to missing observations, we have to deal with unbalanced panel data. 
The number of firms with representative number of observations varies depending on the 
variable. The portion of the finance companies in our CDS data sample is about 10% and about 
39% of the firms have credit rating of A- or higher. The average size of the company is small, 
with about $16,800 million in total assets on average. The average CDS spread is 152.16 basis 
points with large standard deviation. The mean leverage for all companies is about 66% and 
average equity volatility is about 38%.  
4. Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis follows the steps defined above. We investigate the implicit 
government guarantee results first, and then analyze its relation with the CDS spreads. 
4.1. Implicit Government Guarantee 
Consistent with the common belief, we find that both the firm’s size and its finance 
industry membership are related positively to the implicit government guarantee (see Table 2). 
Analyzing the size effect on the financial and non-financial industry, we find no evidence of a 
significant difference between the two (see Table 2, Model 1). The best model specification is 
Model 2, which estimates the government guarantee based on the size variable and the dummy 
variable of finance industry membership, and therefore, this is the specification we use in our 
further analysis.4  
                                                          
4 The choice of model 2 is justified by its parsimony. Although model 1 has a slightly higher pseudo-R2, a test 
comparing both models shows that the difference is not significant enough to justify the inclusion of the additional 
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We construct the implicit government guarantee variable for the sample of 363 firms. The 
average probability of the government bailout for all firms between year 2000 and 2010 is 
0.1155 (see Table 5). However, the average government guarantee varies significantly depending 
on whether the firm belongs to the finance industry or not. We find that the average government 
guarantee for finance firms is 0.8279, whereas for non-finance firms it is only 0.0181. The 
government guarantee also varies by creditworthiness of the company. We find that companies 
with higher credit ratings are slightly more likely to be bailed out by the government. The same 
result holds for both finance and non-finance companies. Additionally, we observe that the 
government guarantee depends on company’s size with large companies being more likely to 
receive the government bailout (see Figure 1). This result holds for both finance and non-finance 
firms. 
0
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Figure 1: Average implicit government guarantee by firm size, finance membership, and firm 
rating.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
variable. Moreover, the size and the finance membership variables display significant relation as evident from their 
respective t-statistics. 
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Figure 2 analyzes the evolution of the implicit government guarantee across time for all 
companies and separately for finance and non-finance firms. We observe that there was a 
downward shift in the probability of the government bailout after the latest financial crisis. This 
effect is more profound for non-financial firms. For financial firms we observe some decrease in 
the implicit government guarantee in 2007-2008 and an increase in 2009. Our data sample is 
dominated by small non-financial firms. Many similar firms failed and were not bailed out by the 
government during the latest financial crisis. Most of the firms that received government 
subsidies were financial firms. This is consistent with the high probability of the government 
bailout for the financial firms and low probability for the non-financial firms that we observe.  
The relative stability of the bailout probability of finance companies may seem 
counterintuitive. In the political environment of 2007-2008 the debate about the end of “Too-
Big-to-Fail” led some investors to lower their expectations about the probability of government 
intervention. Furthermore, letting Lehman Brothers collapse sent a negative signal that weakened 
the government guarantee. At the same time the government passed a bailout plan to save the 
financial system. This somewhat mitigated the drop in probability of government intervention for 
financial companies, even though the overall probability decreased. This result is particularly 
interesting in the sense that it confirms that during the crisis the concept of “Too-Big-to-Fail” 
was questioned, while, at the same time, the financial companies remained more likely to be 
bailed-out. 
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Figure 2: Average implicit government guarantee across time for all firms, finance and non-
finance firms. 
4.2. The CDS Spread Regressions 
Our main findings from the regressions that relate the CDS spreads to the implicit 
government guarantee and other firm specific and macroeconomic variables are reported in 
Table 6. Model 1 is a base line regression of the CDS spreads against the implicit government 
guarantee, model 2 adds the firm-specific control variables to the base model, model 3 adds 
macroeconomic control variables to the base model, model 4 adds all of the control variables to 
the base model, and model 5 analyzes the effects of the business cycle. Empirical results show 
that relative CDS spreads are strongly negatively related to the implicit government guarantee. 
This result holds across all model specifications and the effect remains strong even after 
including all of the control variables. This means that the higher the likelihood of the government 
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to step in and rescue the troubled company, the less the company is viewed as risky and the 
lower the price of the default risk associated with its bonds.  
The effects of all the control variables are consistent with the general intuition and 
expectations based on relevant literature. All firm specific variables are highly significant in any 
model specification. The equity volatility coefficient is positive, which is in line with Zhang, 
Zhou and Zhu [2009] who found that volatility is the main driving factor of the CDS spreads. 
The leverage coefficient is also positive which is consistent with the Merton [1974] framework 
that predicts higher vulnerability of a firm when its leverage ratio increases and approaches 
unity. As expected, the credit ratings are negatively related to the CDS spreads indicating that 
firms with higher credit ratings have lower CDS spreads.  
Finally, we find that the liquidity coefficient is positive demonstrating that the firm’s 
illiquidity increases the CDS spreads. Coefficients associated with the interest rates and the slope 
macroeconomic variables are all negative and highly significant in all model specifications. Both 
the short term interest rate represented by the Libor rate and the five-year T-bond rate are 
negative related with the CDS spreads, which is consistent with Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis 
[2005], Longstaff and Schwartz [1995] and other papers who found that an increase in the 
interest rates reduces company’s default probability which, in turn, reduces the credit spreads. 
The coefficient of the slope variable is also negative which is consistent with the interpretation of 
the slope variable as an indicator of “good times”. Finally, the S&P 500 return coefficient is 
negative, just as expected, but insignificant. 
To relate the government guarantee to the business cycle, specifically, how the 
government actions affect the CDS spreads during the economic crisis, we introduce a dummy 
variable to account for the changes after January 2007. The results in Tables 6 show a stronger 
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effect of the government guarantee on the CDS spreads after this date, suggesting that just before 
or during the crisis investors price the government guarantee more. 
To analyze the industry and the size effect on the CDS spreads we split our data sample 
into financial and non-financial firms and into small and large firms. To split the dataset into the 
large and small companies we used the cutoff value of lasset at 9.9214, which is our data set 
median. The average value of the lasset variable for the “small” data set is 8.7767 and the 
average lasset value for the “large” data set is 11.3550. The regression results are reported in 
Table 7. It shows that the government guarantee variable is significant for all four regressions 
and the rest of the control variables (except for the S&P500 return variable) are all highly 
significant and have expected signs. The effect of the government guarantee is larger for the 
large companies. To get the actual contribution of the government guarantee to the CDS spreads, 
we can multiply the regression coefficients by the average government guarantee for the data 
sample and then by the average five-year T-bond rate. The government guarantee for the large 
companies reduces the CDS spread by about 16.11 bps and for the small companies only by 
about 3.73 bps. Similarly, for the finance industry we obtain that the government guarantee 
reduces the CDS spread by about 76.29 bps and for the non-finance industry only by about 7.50 
bps. This suggests that the size of the company (Too-Big-to-Fail) affects the CDS spreads mainly 
within the financial industry. As financial firms are usually more connected with the whole 
economy, this can be seen as the Too-Interconnected-to-Fail implication.  
5. Other Implications of the Implicit Government Guarantee and its Relationship with the 
CDS Spreads 
For a company the gain from the government intervention goes beyond the cash it 
receives for its rescue. The company will have a direct benefit from its own bailout and the 
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indirect benefit from the rescue of the system. When appropriate, the government intervention 
eventually creates additional value for the system. For instance, Veronesi and Zingales [2010] 
estimate that the U.S. Government intervention in the financial sector, which was announced in 
2008, increased the value of the banks’ financial claims by $131 billion at a cost to taxpayers of 
$25 -$47 billion with a net benefit between $84 and $107 billion. Previously, O’Hara and Shaw 
[1990] found that the public announcement by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1984 that 11 
largest banks were “Too-Big-to-Fail” increased valuation of these banks by 1.3% on average and 
decreased valuation of those banks suspected not to be in that group. 
5.1. Investors Perspective 
Ex-ante, the estimate of the dollar value of the government guarantee for a given firm 
should account for both direct and indirect benefits. While the direct gain can be inferred from 
the amount used to bailout the company, it is difficult to estimate the indirect gain as it includes 
systemic factors and the interconnection between the companies. In efficient markets the overall 
benefit of the government guarantee should be reflected in the CDS spreads. 
Our approach can help estimate the dollar value of the implicit government guarantee for 
bondholders using the relationship between the CDS spread, the probability of default, and the 
bond yield.5 When the government guarantee becomes explicit (e.g. following a bailout plan 
announcement), the impact on the probability of default can be derived using the risk neutral 
implied volatility. For instance, Veronesi and Zingales [2010] estimate that the announcement of 
the 2008 bailout decreases the default probability of eight US biggest financial institutions on 
average by more than half, with Morgan Stanley as the biggest beneficiary.  
                                                          
5 For the details about the link between the CDS spread, the probability of default, and the bond yield, see Hull 
[2012]. 
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While the bondholders extract significant gain from the government intervention through 
the reduction of the CDS spreads, it is less likely the case for the shareholders as the government 
maintains a share of the company at a cheap price during the process. An implication of this is 
that an equity portfolio can be hedged by bond related products to mitigate the risk in case of a 
bailout.  
Our results show strong relationship between the state of the economy and the impact of 
the government guarantee on the CDS spreads. We find that after January 2007, investors 
strongly price the likelihood of the government to step in. As noted above, this may be due to the 
increase in indirect benefits as any potential bailout will be large and involve many companies in 
the system. This finding is another indication in favor of appropriate diversification between 
equity and bonds, especially using products from the finance sector which is more likely to be 
rescued in case of troubles. 
5.2. Regulator Perspective 
The implicit government guarantee poses a serious issue to regulators as it may lead to a 
moral hazard problem associated with the management of “Too-Big-to-Fail” and “Too-
Interconnected-to-Fail” companies. Although the expectation that the government will intervene 
has a positive impact on the financial system as it reduces the risk of bankruptcy and increases 
the enterprise value, the cost is usually supported by the tax payers.  
Another implication of the relationship between the government guarantee and the CDS 
spread is for the regulatory capital whose estimation is based on the assessment of the default 
risk. Implying the default risk of a company from the CDS spreads incorporates the implicit 
government guarantee. This can lead to an underestimation of the actual probability of default 
(without government intervention). As the regulators should protect both the Wall Street and the 
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Main Street, having an estimate of the risk of default without government intervention at the 
expense of tax payers is more appropriate. Therefore, probability of default implied from the 
CDS spreads should be adjusted to account for potential government intervention. Although the 
actual steps for such adjustment are beyond the scope of this paper, we provide some insights for 
this exercise.  
6. Conclusion 
After providing a formal intuitive definition of the implicit government guarantee, we use 
a simple and well elaborated approach to estimate it. Unlike other papers that assess the implicit 
government guarantee in terms of its value, we define it as the likelihood of the government to 
step in and rescue a troubled company. Using a unique sample of data on bailout and bankrupt 
companies, we estimate a logistic function to characterize the implicit government guarantee for 
any company in relation with its size and finance industry membership. In the second step we 
relate the CDS spreads to the implicit government guarantee, and control with the traditional 
variables. 
Empirical results show that the size of the company is secondary in the decision of the 
government to bail it out. The main decisive factor is whether or not the firm belongs to the 
finance industry. Although companies with high ratings are more likely to be rescued, their 
advantage over low rated companies is very small. We also find that the implicit government 
guarantee is priced in the CDS spreads, especially of the financial companies, and therefore, the 
firm’s probability of default implied by the CDS spreads may be biased.  
An important implication of our research is related to the regulatory capital which, when 
implied from the CDS spreads, should be adjusted to account for the implicit government 
guarantee. How to perform such adjustment and how to relate this new measure of the 
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government guarantee to the actual value of the bailout with its relation to the business cycle are 
challenging issues which will be addressed in our future research. 
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Variables definitions 
Variables definition 
Gvt. guarantee Probability of the government to step in and rescue the firm from default 
Dum_Bailout Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm is bailout, and 0 if not 
Dum_Finance  Dummy variable taking value 1 for finance firm, and 0 for non-finance firm 
cds spread Basis points paid as a premium to cover five-year corporate bond 
relative cds spread The CDS spread divided by the five-year T-bond rate 
dum2007 Dummy variable taking value 1 after January 1st, 2007, and 0 before 
lasset The natural logarithm of the total asset of the firm 
Equity volatility The average daily implied volatility from the firm call and put option 
Leverage The total liability divided by the total asset 
Liquidity risk The Bid-Ask spread of the CDS spread divided by the mid-value of Bid and Ask 
Dum_Rating Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm is rating A- or more, and 0 if it is below 
Equity price The closing market price of the equity 
SP500 index  The closing value of the SP500 index 
Libor rate The six month LIBOR rate 
Five-year T-bond rate The five-year rate on government bond 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for bailout and bankrupt firms in relation with the industry (finance 
or not) and their size 
Panel A: Distribution of bankrupt and bailed out firms by industry. 
  Dum_Finance 
Dum_Bailout 
Non-
Finance Finance Total 
No 764 120 884 
 86.43% 13.57% 100.00% 
 97.32% 28.30%  
Yes 21 304 325 
 6.46% 93.54% 100.00% 
 2.68% 71.70%  
Total 785 424 1209 
Panel B: Summary statistics for variables used in the estimation of the government guarantee. 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dum_Bailout 1209 0.2688 0.4435 0 1 
Dum_Finance 1209 0.3507 0.4774 0 1 
lasset 1162 6.9743 1.4759 5.1120 12.7005 
Panel C: Correlation coefficients. 
  Bailout 
Finance 
Industry lasset 
Dum_Bailout 1   
Dum_Finance 0.7548 1  
lasset 0.3596 0.4017 1 
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Table 2: Logit regression of the variable “Dum_Bailout” for the estimation of the probability of 
the government intervention (Government guarantee) using the sample of bailout and bankrupt 
firms over the last decade (2000 – 2010) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Dum_Finance 7.2194*** 5.1975*** 4.2416*** 4.5236***  
 [3.85] [13.81] [6.74] [18.38]  
lasset 0.4362* 0.1643**   0.5431*** 
 [1.78] [2.49]   [10.84] 
lasset × Dum_Finance -0.2883  0.1463**   
 [1.14]  [2.20]   
Constant -7.5506*** -5.6524*** -4.5591*** -3.5940*** 
-
5.0664*** 
 [4.17] [9.91] [12.83] [16.25] [13.54] 
Pseudo R2 0.5599 0.5590 0.5578 0.5035 0.1088 
Observations 1162 1162 1162 1209 1162 
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
absolute cds spread 431,084  152.16 352.96 4.83 89102.50 
relative cds spread 385,615  60.22 173.96 1.01 19153.18 
Gvt. guarantee 918,465  0.10 0.24 0.01 0.88 
dum2007 933,660  0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Dum_Finance 933,660  0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
lasset 918,465  9.73 1.64 4.38 16.74 
Equity volatility 849,241  38.15 20.89 6.38 478.04 
Leverage 918,465  0.66 0.18 0.04 1.84 
Liquidity risk 431,084  0.12 0.08 -1.49 1.80 
Dum_Rating 706,932  0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
SP500 index  872,784  1184.24 195.86 676.03 1565.18 
Libor rate 783,601  2.63 1.81 0.10 6.88 
Five-year T-bond rate 873,822  3.83 1.15 1.26 6.81 
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Table 4: Expected signs on the coefficients of the regression the relative CDS spread against 
explanatory variables. 
Variable Expected Sign 
Gvt. guarantee Negative 
Equity volatility Positive 
Leverage Positive 
Dum_Rating Negative 
Liquidity risk Ambiguous 
Five-year T-bond rate Ambiguous 
Libor rate Ambiguous 
Slope Ambiguous 
SP500 index Negative 
 
 
 
Table 5: Average implicit government guarantee by industry and credit ratings. 
 
All Firms 
Non-Finance 
Firms 
Finance Firms 
Low ratings 0.0460 0.0167 0.7943 
High ratings 0.1990 0.0210 0.8354 
All  0.1155 0.0181 0.8279 
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Table 6: Robust OLS regression of the relative CDS spread on government guarantee, firm 
characteristics and some macro-variables. Independent variables are delayed by one lag (day) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Gvt. guarantee -90.5153*** -33.0911*** -27.6380*** -23.8139*** -21.5670*** 
 (119.33) (44.04) (69.22) (34.04) (32.52) 
Equity volatility  3.7128***  3.5261*** 3.5279*** 
  (80.04)  (70.33) (70.27) 
Dum_rating  -31.5696***  -34.0109*** -33.9273*** 
  (71.02)  (74.04) (73.90) 
Leverage  128.2403***  130.5102*** 130.3980*** 
  (59.76)  (59.48) (59.49) 
Liquidity risk  82.1113***  100.7275*** 99.1654*** 
  (18.29)  (26.13) (26.06) 
SP500 return   -17.5405 -42.958 -42.4033 
   (0.54) (1.56) (1.54) 
Libor rate   -10.6544*** -15.0732*** -14.6825*** 
   (30.29) (45.00) (43.16) 
Slope   -59.5017*** -36.4757*** -36.2104*** 
   (52.72) (45.58) (45.28) 
Five-year T-bond rate   -83.8283*** -14.3732*** -14.7554*** 
   (91.69) (22.32) (22.94) 
Gvt. guarantee × dum2007     -7.5533*** 
     (7.49) 
Constant 73.5576*** -163.3195*** 452.9352*** -25.6303*** -25.4407*** 
 (176.86) (54.48) (84.27) (6.20) (6.16) 
Observations 302625 234641 292166 228163 228163 
R-squared 0.0154 0.4293 0.1226 0.4406 0.4406 
Robust t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 7: Robust OLS regression of the relative CDS spread on government guarantee, firm 
characteristics and some macro-variables. Independent variables are lagged by one day. 
  Size Industry 
  Small Comp Large Comp.  Finance Comp. Non-Fin Comp. 
Gvt. guarantee -9.7705*** -18.9982***  -23.8361*** -108.5005*** 
 (4.34) (20.33)  (7.75) (19.36) 
Equity volatility 4.3437*** 3.0799***  2.8611*** 3.7446*** 
 (68.20) (42.57)  (28.28) (62.96) 
Dum_rating -0.7728 -47.3761***  -72.9921*** -28.8299*** 
 (1.27) (45.70)  (24.77) (64.48) 
Leverage 145.7911*** 123.7569***  142.1605*** 136.0902*** 
 (50.81) (35.74)  (17.66) (57.20) 
Liquidity risk 68.5058*** 90.8705***  137.4265*** 102.0955*** 
 (11.70) (17.53)  (12.44) (25.80) 
SP500 return -29.7904 -43.3147  -11.0487 -41.5322 
 (0.93) (0.98)  (0.13) (1.44) 
Libor rate -15.3510*** -15.5319***  -17.2998*** -14.2797*** 
 (36.51) (30.76)  (15.51) (39.02) 
Slope -35.8695*** -35.6087***  -39.2926*** -35.1857*** 
 (35.34) (29.43)  (16.67) (41.29) 
Five-year T-bond rate -10.5933*** -12.6609***  -5.7037*** -11.4999*** 
 (11.54) (14.34)  (3.31) (16.25) 
Constant -86.5279*** -2.5271  -8.799 -46.2918*** 
 (13.31) (0.53)  (1.03) (9.90) 
Observations 108388 119775  25170 202993 
R-squared 0.5542 0.3624  0.5416 0.4339 
Robust t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
